We develop a model of product (i.e., quality-improving) research and development (R&D) investment competition in a horizontally differentiated duopoly. In particular, based on a third-country market model, we consider the optimal product R&D investment policy under international rivalry in the presence of demand spillover effects associated with improving the quality level of a product. We show how the optimality of a non-cooperative and a cooperative R&D investment policy depends on the strength of demand spillover effects. Furthermore, we consider the same issues in the case of heterogeneous consumers and alternative utility functions.
Introduction
Firms compete on not only price but also non-price strategies such as research and development (R&D), advertising, and other instruments in their domestic and global markets. 1 That is, there is no doubt that international price and quality competition among firms prevails in many industries, such as manufacturing electronic appliances, computers, high-definition televisions, mobile phones, and other products. There is also international rivalry among firms in advanced countries, and between firms in advanced countries in newly industrialized countries, (including Korea, China, India) and those in advanced countries. Furthermore, many governments support domestic firms' activities using various instruments, for example, subsidies, tax credits, and other regulations, although they cannot publicly promote the firms' export activities under the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, because strategic industrial policy that subsidizes R&D investments is not necessarily prohibited, domestic firms' R&D activities are often subsidized.
Since the seminal papers of Brander and Spencer (1983) and Spencer and Brander(1983) , the analysis of strategic trade and industrial policy has become a core element of international economics and trade policy (see Brander, 1995) . These authors consider a Cournot duopoly in a homogeneous product market and analyze process (i.e., cost-reducing) R&D investment competition. In particular, they analyze how process R&D investments affect the environment for market competition and show that an optimal R&D investment policy is a subsidy.
We focus on an R&D investment as a non-price instrument and strategic industrial policy, i.e., an R&D investment subsidy/tax, in the case of international duopolistic competition. In this case, we look at two types of R&D investment: a process and a product R&D investment. 2 Furthermore, we consider externalities such as technology and demand spillover effects.
First, regarding technology spillovers of process R&D investment, Atallah (2005) , D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) , De Bondt and Veugelers (1991) , and De Bondt and Henriques (1995) , for example, consider the intra-industry spillover effect of an R&D investment on the marginal cost of production. In particular, assuming asymmetric technology spillovers, De Bondt and Henriques analyzes non-cooperative R&D investment competition, whereas Atallah examines R&D cooperation. Furthermore, based on Brander and Spencer's third-country market model, Liao (2007) considers non-cooperative and jointly optimal R&D subsidy polices in the presence of international technology spillovers. He explains how the recent rapid growth in intellectual property trade and the increase in cooperative joint ventures have led to international technology spillovers. 3 In fact, intellectual property rights (IPR) protection is not perfect. That is, under the WTO, the Agreement of Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) requires all member countries to provide a minimum level of IPR protection, no matter where the technology is developed. However, the IPR protection policies in most developing countries are likely to be weak, compared with those in most developed countries. 4 2 Regarding the empirical analysis of process and product R&D investments, see Levin and Reiss (1988) and Ornaghi (2006) . 3 DeCourcy (2005) examines cooperative R&D policies such as R&D cartels, research joint ventures, or research joint venture cartels and R&D subsidy policy. 4 Kang (2006) examines endogenous choice of an IPR protection level and shows that each government chooses a sufficiently weak IPR protection level.
As described below, because both Liao (2007) and our model assume linearity of the demand and cost functions, including spillover effects, the characteristics of both models are similar. 5 Thus, we derive the same results as Liao regarding optimal R&D investment policies under non-cooperative and cooperative behavior. However, Liao focuses on international interfirm technology spillovers, whereas we focus on the effect of demand spillovers on consumers' preferences in the thirdcountry market. Thus, we do not care about regulations such as IPR protection policies.
Second, we investigate product R&D investment and strategic industrial policy. Based on a model of vertical product differentiation, some researchers have analyzed strategic product R&D investment policies under international rivalry, for example, Jinji (2003) , Park (2001) , Zhou, Spencer, & Vertinsky (2002) , and others. They show that the optimal non-cooperative R&D investment policy introduced by the government targeting a firm producing a high (low) quality product is a tax (subsidy) under international price competition. In this case, these researchers implicitly assume the case of partial market coverage, in which there are some consumers who do not purchase any products. However, under the case of full market coverage, in which all consumers purchase a product, a firm producing a low quality product chooses the lower limit quality level. That is, there is a corner solution. Thus, the R&D investment policy does not affect the firm's activities. In this paper, assuming a Hotelling model with quality choice (e.g., Ishibashi & Kaneko, 2008; Sanjo, 2007) and a horizontally and vertically differentiated products market (André, González, & Porteiro, 2009 ), we examine the optimal R&D investment policies in the case of full market coverage.
We introduce demand spillover effects into a horizontally differentiated duopoly model with endogenous quality choice. With respect to demand spillovers, for example, we consider environmental externalities. Suppose that the development of an eco-vehicle equipped with an electric motor or a hybrid engine enhances the willingness to pay of customers who are sensitive to environmental issues but do not consider the car's brand name to be important. This implies that some of these (or new) customers may purchase an eco-vehicle regardless of the brand. Thus, the development of a new product and/or the upgrading of the quality of an existing product may expand the size of the market. As a result, one firm's quality-improving R&D investment may increase a rival firm's market share.
Another example of demand spillovers arises in the context of compatible network goods in information and communication technology industries such as mobile telecommunications, computer hardware and software, and others. In particular, customers whose hardware (developed by some firms) is compatible with multiple firms' software are happy to use software and applications that were developed for rival firms' hardware in order to increase the quality of their own systems.
Closely related to our model and dealing with demand spillovers associated with improving the quality of a horizontally differentiated product, we have Foros, Hansen, and Sand (2002) who discuss the role of roaming, which is endogenously determined by competitive firms in a mobile phone industry. Roaming in their models corresponds to the parameter indicating demand spillover effects in our model. Furthermore, we consider a quality-improving R&D investment to be an advertising investment that creates market demand. Ma and Ulph (2012) consider the effect of an advertising subsidy under international oligopolistic competition. They examine cooperative and predatory advertising investment. In our model, as shown below, the former (latter) responds to a quality-improving R&D investment for which the effect of demand spillovers is larger (smaller) than that of product substitutability. Toshimitsu (2012a) assumes that the upgrading of product quality generates external negative and positive effects on the demand side, which are termed combative and constructive effects, respectively. 6 In relation to the latter, it is worth examining the demand-side effects of advertising investment. That is, persuasive and/or informative advertising investment by a firm may attract customers not only to itself but also to rivals. Thus, advertising expands the size of the market by attracting new consumers.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze quality-improving R&D investment competition and strategic R&D investment policy under international rivalry. In particular, we develop a horizontal product differentiation model that incorporates endogenous quality choice. Furthermore, assuming demand spillovers associated with improving the quality of a product, we consider how the strength of demand spillovers affects the optimality of a non-cooperative and a cooperative R&D investment policy.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present a demand function with spillover effects involving quality improvement and consider the endogenous quality decision under an international Bertrand price competition. Then, we examine the optimal non-cooperative and cooperative R&D investment policies. Furthermore, in Section 3, assuming heterogeneous consumers and alternative utility functions associated with a horizontal product differentiation model including endogenous quality choice, we examine the same problems as in the previous section. In Section 4, we summarize our results and raise some remaining issues.
Quality Competition, Demand Spillovers, and Optimal R&D Investment Policy

A Horizontal Product Differentiation Model with Quality Choice and Demand Spillovers
To consider a strategic R&D investment policy, we employ the standard framework of a third-country market (e.g., . That is, there are two countries, home and foreign, each of which has a single firm. The firm located in the home (foreign) country is denoted as firm 1 (2). The firms compete in a two-stage game. In stage 1, the firms simultaneously choose the quality level, q i , i = 1, 2. In stage 2, the firms simultaneously choose the price, p i , i = 1, 2.
In stage 0, prior to the game played by the firms, the home and foreign governments either non-cooperatively or cooperatively commit to an R&D investment subsidy/tax policy. We confine our attention to subgame perfect equilibria by solving the model backward.
We assume that the utility of a representative consumer in the third-country market is given by V = U + y, and
where y is the numeral good and p y = 1. In addition, α > 0, and θ ∈ [0, 1) is a parameter indicating substitutability between the products. For the second term (composed of quality levels) of equation (1), ε i ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, 2, expresses a marginal demand spillover effect associated with an increase in the quality level of product i. The budget constraint is given by I ≥ p 1 x 1 + p 2 x 2 + y, so that we obtain the optimal behavior of a representative consumer as follows:
Hence, an increase in the quality level of products j increases the willingness to pay for product i, because of demand spillovers. Thus, the demand function of product i is given by:
In view of equation (2), we have:
As shown in equation (3), if the marginal demand spillover effect of product j is larger (smaller) than the degree of product substitutability, an increase in the quality level increases (decreases) the demand of product i.
Quality Decision and Demand Spillovers
In stage 2, firm i decides the price to maximize the profit, i.e.,
To simplify, the production cost is assume to be zero. Furthermore, s i > (<)0 is an R&D investment subsidy (tax) for firm i. The first-order condition (FOC) to maximize the profit of firm i is given by
Equation (4) denotes the reaction function of firm i. That is, if ε j > (<)θ , an increase in the quality level of product j shifts the reaction curve upward (downward).
The price of product i in the Nash equilibrium is given by:
Hereafter, we omit the indexes of the firms in each equation, i.e., i, j = 1, 2, i = j, unless we refer to them specifically. Regarding equation (5), it holds that: (5) and (6) show that if the degree of the parameter composed of demand spillovers with product j, i.e., (ε j ), is larger (smaller) than that of product substitutability, i.e., θ, then the quality improvement of product j increases (decreases) the price of product i.
In stage 1, firm i decides the quality level that maximizes the profit, i.e., i =
The second-order condition (SOC) is given by:
Regarding the cross-effect, we obtain:
Thus, it holds that:
In view of equation (6), equation (10) implies that the slope of the reaction functions (in other words, the strategic relationship between the firms) depends on the strength of the rival firm's demand spillover. Furthermore, the external effect on the profit (revenue) is given by:
Thus, we obtain:
Given equation (6), equation (12) illustrates that the sign depends on the strength of the rival firm's demand spillover.
For the following analysis, we assume that the demand spillover of product 1 is larger than that of product 2; i.e., ε 1 > ε 2 . Hence, it holds that 1 = (ε 1 ) > 2 = (ε 2 ). Based on equations (6), (10), and (12), we derive the following lemma.
Lemma 1
(1) If 1 > 2 > θ, each firm's reaction curve is sloping upward. Hence, an increase in the quality of product 2 (1) increases the revenue of firm 1 (2). (2) If θ > 1 > 2 , each firm's reaction curve is sloping downward. Hence, an increase in the quality of product 2 (1) decreases the revenue of firm 1 (2). (3) If 1 > θ > 2 , firm 1's reaction curve is sloping downward, whereas firm 2's is sloping upward. Hence, an increase in the quality of product 2 (1) decreases (increases) the revenue of firm 1 (2).
Regarding Lemma 1 (1) (Lemma 1 (2)), if the degree of demand spillovers of both firms' products is larger (smaller) than that of product substitutability, an increase in the quality level of the firm expands (reduces) the rival firm's demand, and this, in turn, increases (decreases) the rival firm's price and quality. Thus, the rival firm's profit increases (decreases). Similarly, the firm's profit increases (decreases) with an increase in the quality of the rival firm's product. In this case, a strategic complementary (substitutionary) relationship between the firms holds. See Figure 1 (Figure 2 ). Furthermore, regarding Lemma 1 (3), when the strength of demand spillovers is asymmetric between the firms, i.e., the degree of the demand spillover of product 1 is larger and that of product 2 is smaller than that of product substitutability, an increase in the quality of product 1 expands firm 2's demand, while an increase in the quality of product 2 reduces firm 1's demand. In this case, firm 2 increases its price and quality, while firm 1 decreases its price and quality. As a result, firm 2's profit increases, while firm 1's falls. Thus, a strategic substitutionary (complementary) relationship holds for firm 1 (2). See Figure 3 .
Taking equation (7) into account, the effect of an R&D investment subsidy on the product qualities is given by:
In particular, in view of equations (10) and (14), the effect on the quality level of product j depends on the cross-effect, i.e., the strength of demand spillovers. 
The Unilateral R&D Investment Policy
We consider the unilaterally set R&D investment policy at stage 0. That is, noncooperatively, government i chooses an investment subsidy/tax for its domestic firm to maximize social welfare, i.e.,
Based on the FOC to maximize the social welfare of country i, we derive the optimal R&D investment policy in the non-cooperative case as follows:
Taking equations (13) and (14) into account, equation (15) can be expressed as
Because it holds that sign dq j dq i = sign ∂ 2 j ∂q j ∂q i , equation (16) can be rewritten as:
Therefore, let us summarize the results as follows.
Lemma 2 A non-cooperative optimal R&D investment policy by the home government depends on:
(i) the sign of the externality of the foreign firm's R&D activities on the home firm, i.e., ∂R i /∂q j , i, j = 1, 2, i = j, and (ii) the sign of the slope of the foreign firm's R&D investment reaction curves, i.e., dq j /dq i , in other words, the sign of the cross-effect of the foreign firms profit function, i.e., ∂ 2 j /∂q j ∂q i , i, j = 1, 2, i = j, where firm i (j) is the home (foreign) firm.
An optimal R&D investment policy in the non-cooperative case is one in which the government makes its domestic firm a leader in a Stackelberg game. This aspect has already been addressed in the context of strategic trade and industrial policies. Based on equation (17) and Lemmas 1 and 2, we derive the following results.
Proposition 1
(1) If either 1 > 2 > θ or θ > 1 > 2 , then an R&D investment subsidy is optimal; i.e., s * i > 0, i = 1, 2.
(2) If 1 > θ > 2 , then an R&D investment tax is optimal; i.e., s * i < 0, i = 1, 2.
Regarding Proposition 1 (1), if the degree of demand spillovers of both firms is either larger or smaller than that of product substitutability, each government gives its domestic firm a subsidy to upgrade its quality level. Incidentally, in the case of large demand spillovers, the strategic complementary relationship between the firms is sustained. Thus, subsidizing the domestic firm increases the quality levels of both home and foreign firms. This, in turn, leads to an increase in the profits of both firms and thus the welfare of both countries (see point S 1 in Figure 1 ). Namely, in this case, the nature of the R&D investment is constructive rather than combative. Because the market size increases through the quality improvement of the products, both governments will subsidize the domestic firm.
On the contrary, in the case of small demand spillovers, the strategic substitutionary relationship between the firms is sustained. Thus, subsidizing the domestic firm reduces the foreign firm's quality level, but increases the domestic firm's one. This, in turn, leads to a decrease in the foreign firm's profit, and an increase in that of the domestic firm (see point S 1 in Figure 2 ). In this case, the nature of the R&D investment is combative rather than constructive. Namely, although the size of the market does not expand through the quality improvement of the products, the foreign firm's share is reduced by an increase in the quality level of the domestic firm's product. Thus, each government will subsidize its domestic firm in order to expand its market share. Consequently, the two governments are caught in the prisoners' dilemma.
Regarding Proposition 1 (2), in the case of asymmetric demand spillovers, each government taxes the domestic firm to reduce its quality level. That is, a decrease in the quality level of firm 1 (2) decreases (increases) the quality level of firm 2 (1). In this case, the profit of firm 1 (2) increases because of the negative (positive) externality effect on the revenue of firm 1 (2). Incidentally, taxing firm 1, which produces a product with a large demand spillover, reduces the quality levels of both firms. This mitigates the degree of the fall in the price of firm 1 and expands its market share. Accordingly, the R&D investment tax increases the profit of firm 1 and the welfare of the country, although it reduces the profit of firm 2. By contrast, taxing firm 2, which produces the product with small demand spillovers, reduces its quality level, but increases the quality level of firm 1. This mitigates the degree of the fall in the price of firm 2 and expands its demand. In addition, the profit of firm 1 increases. Accordingly, the R&D investment tax increases the profits of both firms and thus the welfare of both countries. This implies that the policy of imposing an R&D investment tax on the firm producing the product with small demand spillovers is Pareto improving for both countries (see point S 2 in Figure 3 ).
The Cooperative R&D Investment Policy
As mentioned in the Introduction, currently, many governments decide their R&D policy cooperatively and agree on cooperative R&D activities. Here, we assume that each government decides an R&D investment policy to maximize the joint social welfare of both countries;
In this case, the joint social welfare of both countries is identical to the aggregate profits of both firms; W(s 1 ,
The FOC to maximize the joint social welfare with respect to a cooperative R&D investment policy of the home government is represented by:
Similarly,
Based on equations (13), (14), (18), and (19), the optimal cooperative R&D investment policy is given by:
where superscript C denotes the cooperative policy case. Therefore, we summarize the result as follows.
Lemma 3
The optimal cooperative R&D investment policy of the home government depends on the sign of the externality of the home firm's R&D activities on the foreign firm, i.e., ∂R j /∂q i , i, j = 1, 2, i = j, where firm i (j) is the home (foreign) firm.
The optimal cooperative R&D investment policies of the governments are determined by joint welfare maximization. This implies that both firms collusively determine their quality levels to maximize their joint profits; however, they non-cooperatively compete in prices in the product market, i.e., a case of semi-collusion. Therefore, both firms choose the quality level existing in Paretosuperior sets, which correspond to the slashed-lines area in figures. For example, in the case of large demand spillovers, i.e., 1 > 2 > θ, both firms choose higher quality levels than the levels in the Nash equilibrium. In other words, each government subsidizes its domestic firm (see Figure 1) . With respect to the other cases of demand spillovers, we can similarly explain the optimal cooperative R&D investment policy. Therefore, based on equation (20) and Lemmas 1 and 3, we derive the following proposition.
Proposition 2
(1) If 1 > 2 > θ (θ > 1 > 2 ), then a cooperative R&D investment subsidy (tax) is optima; i.e., s C i > 0(s C i < 0), i = 1, 2.
(2) If 1 > θ > 2 , then a cooperative R&D investment subsidy on firm 1 and tax on firm 2 are optimal; i.e., s C 1 > 0 and s C 2 < 0.
Let us consider the interesting case in which there are asymmetric demand spillovers, i.e., Proposition 2 (2). In the model of vertical product differentiation, Proposition 3 in Zhou et al. (2002) says that jointly optimal policies involve an investment subsidy in the more developed country and an investment tax in the less developed country. In their model, the firm producing the high (low) quality product locates in the more (less) developed country. That is, the jointly optimal policies expand the difference in quality levels and thus mitigate price competition. This, in turn, increases the joint profits of the firms and thus the joint welfare of their countries.
Regarding our model, if we assume that a firm producing a product associated with large (small) demand spillovers locates in the more (less) developed country, by the same reasons derived in the results of Zhou et al. (2002) , we find that cooperative R&D policy is a mix of an investment subsidy in the more developed country and an investment tax in the less developed country. Furthermore, based on the analysis of Kang (2006) , we can interpret the economic implications of the results derived in Liao (2007, Table 2 ) as follows. If the large (small) technology spillover corresponds to the weak (strong) IPR protection policy, then the optimal R&D investment policy in the case of cooperation by the more (less) developed country is a subsidy (tax).
Discussion: Heterogeneous Consumers and Alternative Utility Functions
A Hotelling Model with Quality Choice
In the previous section, we assumed homogeneous consumers with a standard quasi-linear utility function with quality arguments and demand spillovers. Here we assume heterogeneous consumers and use a standard Hotelling spatial model of duopoly associated with quality choice. That is, there is a continuum of consumers uniformly distributed on the [0, 1] interval. The density of consumers is assumed to be one. Firm i(i = 0, 1) supplies a product with quality q i and price p i . Furthermore, let us introduce a demand spillover effect involving a quality upgrade into a Hotelling model. In this case, a consumer located at x ∈ [0, 1] has net utility U 0 = v + q 0 + ε 1 q 1 − p 0 − tx when he or she purchases product 0. When purchasing product 1, the net utility is
Here, v(> 0) is the utility obtained from consuming a single unit of the product, irrespective of the quality level. In addition, the parameter t(> 0) implies the transportation cost. The parameter ε i ∈ [0, 1), i = 0, 1, denotes a marginal demand spillover effect. Thus, the demand function of product i is given by:
We derive the equilibrium price in stage 2 as follows:
Therefore, the revenue function of firm i in stage 1 is given by:
where i, j = 0, 1, i = j. Based on equation (23), we obtain the externality of firm j on the revenue of firm i, and the factor deciding the strategic relationship between the firms as follows:
where i, j = 0, 1, i = j. Thus, taking equations (17) and (20) and Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 into account, we derive the following results.
Corollary 1
(1) A unilateral R&D investment subsidy is an optimal policy; i.e., s * i > 0, i = 0, 1.
(2) A cooperative R&D investment tax is an optimal policy; i.e., s C i < 0, i = 0, 1.
These results are similar to those of Spencer and Brander (1983, Proposition 2) and the case of a small demand spillover, as in Propositions 1 (1) and 2 (1) of our model. That is, in view of equations (2) and (5), when weak demand spillovers exists, an increase in the quality of the firm's product reduces the rival firm's demand and price. Hence, because the strategic substitutionary relationship between the firms is sustained, the government provides an investment subsidy to the domestic firm to increase the quality level. However, when both governments determine the R&D investment policy cooperatively, in other words, when both firms decide their quality levels collusively, the optimal policy is an investment tax to reduce the quality level.
A Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation Model
We now exploit the utility function composed of horizontally and vertically differentiated products presented by André et al. (2009, Section 6) . That is, there is a continuum of consumers uniformly distributed on the [0, 1] interval. The density of consumers is assumed to be one. Firm i (i = 0, 1) supplies product at quality q i with price p i . In the case of a horizontal and vertical product differentiation model, a consumer located at x ∈ [0, 1] has net utility U 0 = (1 − x)(q 0 + ε 1 q 1 ) − p 0 when he or she purchases product 0. When purchasing product 1, the net utility is U 1 = x(q 1 + ε 0 q 0 ) − p 1 . Thus, we derive the demand function of firm i as follows:
The equilibrium price in stage 2 is given by:
Based on equation (28), we obtain the externality of firm j on the revenue of firm i, and the factor deciding the strategic relationship between firms as follows:
where
In view of equations (29) and (30), and taking equations (17) and (20) and Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 into account, we derive the following results.
Corollary 2
(1) A unilateral R&D investment tax is an optimal policy; i.e., s * i < 0, i = 0, 1. (2) A cooperative R&D investment subsidy is an optimal policy; i.e., s C i > 0, i = 0, 1.
These results are the reverse of Corollary 1 derived in the Hotelling model with quality choice analyzed in Section 3.1. This is because the sign of the externality is different between equations (24) and (29), although the sign indicating the strategic relationship between the firms is negative as in equations (25) and (30); i.e., strategic substitutes. That is, in view of equations (21) and (26), an increase in the quality level of the firm's product reduces the rival firm's demand, irrespective of the type of utility functions. However, in equation (22), the increase decreases the rival firm's price, whereas, in equation (27), it increases the rival firm's price. Hence, the sign of the externality is negative, as in equation (24). On the other hand, because the effect of an increase in the price is larger than that of a decrease in the demand, the sign of the externality is positive, as in equation (29).
The consumers purchase one of the two products; that is, the case of full market coverage is assumed in the two models. Thus, an increase in the quality of one firm's product reduces the market share of the other firm, directly and indirectly through prices; however, as mentioned above, the effect on the prices is different in each model. This implies that the demand spillover effect is negative combative only. By contrast, homogeneous consumers in the market are assumed in our developed model. Because a representative consumer purchases the two products, an increase in the quality level of the firm's product increases the consumer's utility and thus the willingness to pay for it. In this case, if the effect of product substitutability is larger than that of demand spillovers, then the consumer purchases more of the firm's product, and less of the rival firm's product. Conversely, if the effect of demand spillovers is larger than that of product substitutability, then the consumer purchases more of both products. There are differences regarding the consumer's behavior and the market structure between the two models and ours. That is, there are both combative and constructive effects of demand spillovers in our model.
Conclusion
We have examined quality-improving R&D investment competition and optimal policy under international rivalry. Based on a vertical product differentiation model, Zhou et al. (2002) and others have considered an optimal product R&D investment policy. In a sense, they illustrate the differences in the strategic policies of an advanced and a newly industrialized country. In particular, when a firm producing a product of high (low) quality locates in a more (less) developed country, a unilateral R&D tax (subsidy) in an advanced (a newly industrialized) country is optimal in the case of international price competition. By contrast, in this paper, using a horizontal product differentiation model with quality choice, we have analyzed the same issues explored in previous studies. Furthermore, we have introduced demand spillover effects into the model. That is, an increase in the quality level of the firm's product can increase the rival firm's demand and profit. In other words, by focusing on both horizontal product differentiation (i.e., brand name) and vertical product differentiation (i.e., quality), in the case of similar demand spillover effects between the firms' products, we analyze strategic policy and competition between advanced countries such as the US, the EU, and Japan. In addition, in the case of asymmetric demand spillover effects, we analyze strategic policy and competition between an advanced country (e.g., the US) and a newly industrializing country (e.g., China).
We have found the following. In the cases of large and small demand spillovers with respect to the firms' products, e.g., the situation of similar demand spillover effects between firms in advanced countries, an R&D investment subsidy is optimal. However, in the case of asymmetric demand spillover effects, an R&D investment tax is optimal for both the advanced country and the newly industrializing country. In particular, the government of a newly industrializing country should reduce the domestic firm's R&D activity to exploit the large demand spillovers of the firm in the advanced country.
Furthermore, we have considered the optimality of cooperative R&D investment policy. In particular, in the case of asymmetric demand spillovers, we obtained the same results as Zhou et al. (2002) . That is, if a firm producing the product associated with large (small) demand spillovers is located in the advanced (newly industrializing) country, then an optimal cooperative R&D investment policy combines a subsidy in the advanced country with a tax in the newly industrializing country.
Finally, there is one qualification to our model. We have exogenously introduced demand spillover effects associated with quality levels into the standard quasi-linear utility function. Thus, in future work, we need to consider a general form of the utility function that includes demand spillover effects associated with quality improvement.
